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This commentary is intended to bring out other sides of what 
Bishop refers to as the crisis in contemporary mathematics. We 
prefer not to call the situation a crisis because we do not see 
enough evidence that it is unstable. Instead, we wish to talk 
about the way in which contemporary mathematics has imposed upon 
itself arbitrary limits. We believe that, in the absence of 
these limits, the particular philosophical and mathematical issues 
which Bishop has raised would be of natural concern to the 
mathematical community at large. 
The arbitrary limits to which we refer have their origins 
in a revolutionary change in mathematical world-view which took 
place during the period 1870-1930 (i.e., the period that begins 
with Weierstrass' "rigorous" codification of analysis and ends 
with Hilbert's formalist program for "savingt* it). Before 1870, 
pure mathematics had a flourishing empirico-inductive tradition 
which included, though not as its "foundations", a growing 
logico-deductive component. The hallmark of the empirico- 
inductive tradition was its primary concern with the phenomena 
of mathematics. Its theories were theories about the phenomena, 
just as in a physical theory. (Gauss I Disquisitiones Arithmeticae 
is a classic work in this tradition.) By 1930, the situation 
had changed completely. By then, there was a nearly universal 
acceptance of the modern strictly logico-deductive conception 
of pure mathematics and the empirico-inductive tradition had 
been virtually suppressed. 
In empirico-inductive mathematics, the meaning of any theorem 
is in what it tells us about the phenomena it describes. By 
contrast, modern logico-deductive mathematics is marked by a 
detachment of the theorems from the phenomena (which are now 
demoted to the status of "examples" or "illustrations" of the 
theorems). For instance, one may prove theorems about "all 
continuous functions" without being interested in any continuous 
function. In the same spirit, although the Bolzano-Weierstrass 
theorem is considered to be a central result in the logico- 
deductive foundations of analysis, its significance is not that 
it enables one to actually extract a convergent subsequence from 
any particular bounded one (it doesn't), but rather that, accord- 
ing to the rules of the logico-deductive "game", it allows one 
to assume that, in any given case, the convergent subsequence 
has been extracted. 
This modern conception of mathematics as a deductive game is 
reflected in the view that the job of a pure mathematician is to 
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prove theorems : that theorems are the only valid end-product of 
pure mathematical research. (One consequence of this is that, 
even though the invention of efficient methods of computation 
may require purely mathematical insights and need not be an 
application of any pre-existing theories, outside of number theory 
this is usually considered to be “applied mathematics”.) But it 
is arbitrary to adopt such a limited definition of “pure mathematics 
Unlike the revolution in physics which took place at about 
the same time (quantum theory, relativity theory), the radical 
shift in mathematics from an empirico-inductive to a strictly 
logico-deductive world-view was not initially a response to newly 
discovered phenomena which could not be accounted for in the old 
system. In fact, it was originally not a revolution at all but 
a series of attempts to “put things right” (e.g., by Weierstrassian 
rigor), to end debate about fundamental issues such as the nature 
of number and infinity, and to establish order in mathematics 
under the “higher” authority of logic (as in the programs of Peano, 
Russell and Hilbert). However, while there was doubtless a real 
need to clarify the meaning of the mathematics, the intuitionists 
had pointed out early on, and Hilbert himself eventually recognized, 
that “logic alone does not suffice.” This, in fact, was the great 
lesson of Weierstrass’ work. Only when his strictly logically- 
based formulation of analysis had been carefully worked out was 
it possible to see to what extent (and precisely in what way) 
logic and empirical meaning were in conflict in mathematics. 
That logically equivalent assertions can have different empirical 
meanings is obvious: they are generally statements about totally 
different phenomena. But it was Brouwer’s great achievement to 
see,by an examination of Weierstrass’ rigorously developed “logical” 
mathematics, just how fundamental (and interesting) the conflict 
was. (See, e.g., Brouwer’s classic essay, “On the significance 
of the principle of excluded middle in mathematics, especially 
in function theory”, in [Cll].) 
Here, finally, was a new and truly unexpected discovery: 
a limitation in the mathematical domain of validity of logical 
laws, new phenomena which violate accepted truths, new structures 
of a fundamental kind. This is the stuff scientific revolutions 
are made of. Once the conflict between logic and meaning had 
been exposed, it was not possible to go on as before. Yet this 
was just what most mathematicians wished to do. By this time, 
they had become deeply committed to the logically-based theories 
and desired, above all, that the conflict be resolved without 
tampering with these theories, so that they could continue to 
work in the familiar ways. This was done (with the support of 
Hilbert’s formalist program) but at the price of abandoning the 
ground of empirical meaning and retreating to the position that 
pure mathematics is really only a formal game. Weyl called this 
retreat a “radical reinterpretation *I of the nature of mathematics. 
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(See his "Comments on Hilbert's second lecture on the foundations 
of mathematics", also in [Cll].) 
Today, the "official" position is still that mathematics is 
not about anything. Yet, for those who are not content merely 
to play the game, the need for meaning is as real as was the 
need for rigor. This bind is unnecessary. There was another 
direction the revolution might have taken fifty years ago and, 
even now, it is not too late. 
[The above paper was invited after the Workshop and is based 
on a transcript of Bishop's talk.] 
